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CAN RIGHTS MOVE LEFf?
Jeremy Paul*

By Jeremy Waldron. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. x, 470. $59.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY.

No one doubts that America's wealth is unevenly distributed.
Figures from the most recent Statistical Abstract indicate that while
roughly six percent of the country's households had a 1984 net worth
of more than $250,000, a whopping twenty-six percent held $5000 or
less. 1 In the world's richest nation, over 32 million people live below
the governmentally defined poverty level. 2
Although these economic disparities would seem enough to provoke immediate outrage, progressive critics face a familiar political
roadblock. Economic inequality often appears to be a logical outgrowth of America's historic commitment to private property. After
all, if vast resources are in private hands, how can we blame the state
for private transactions that result in some hands holding more than
others? And, if private property renders the State relatively powerless,
how can citizens expect greater distributional equity than what has
been or could reasonably be achieved through redistributive taxation?
Such questions suggest a choice between private property on the one
hand, and greater equality on the other.
Moreover, this choice is more rhetorical than real. Given the other
alternatives, it seems safe to say that most Americans want a private
property system. Accordingly, politically meaningful debate now focuses more on narrow questions of taxation policy than on first principles of ownership. Does all this mean that people committed to
greater economic equality are doomed to a ceaseless and futile assault
'on the nation's most cherished economic principle?
The short answer is no. Indeed, several strategies are available to
confront the seeming conflict between private property and distributional equity. As a tactical matter, one approach is to concede the
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. A.B. 1978, Princeton University;
J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School.-Ed. I am grateful to the participants in the University of
Connecticut Faculty Seminar and especially to David Carlson, Mary Coombs, Gregory Everts,
Michael Fischl, David Frankford, Jennifer Jaff, James Kainen, Laurel Leff, James Lindgren,
Joseph McCahery, Tom Morawetz, Eve Paul, Robert Rosen, Stephen Utz and Steven Winter for
their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 459 (109th ed. 1989).
2. Barringer, Number ofNation~ Poor Remains at 32 Million for a Second Year. N. Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1989, at A24, col. 1 (reporting 1988 figures released by the federal census bureau).
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competing tensions between property and equality and simply push
hard on the equality side of the scale. One might note, for example,
that since our system already includes redistributive taxation, it is implausible to claim that redistribution is inconsistent with a private
property regime. Moreover, since the correct level of taxation cannot
possibly flow logically from the mere concept of property, the line separating permissible redistribution from impermissible confiscation will
inevitably be the outcome of political debate. Accordingly, egalitarians might engage in disputes over types and levels of taxation as a
means of battling inequality without challenging the private property
system or its seemingly unavoidable conflict with egalitarian
aspirations.
Two related difficulties, however, confront efforts to make redistributive taxation the conceptual foundation of claims for more equal
distributions of wealth. Initially, the mere presence of any redistributive taxation must itself be justified. Thus, to argue that there is no
logical stopping point between some redistributive taxation and massive redistribution is to risk provoking a conservative backlash that
concedes the point and demands an end to all redistribution. 3 More
fundamentally, calls for a broadly redistributive tax may give away the
game at the outset. Citizens may come to see the tax as an after-thefact exaction imposed on otherwise legitimate distributions of wealth
and income. In other words, taxes will seem re distributional as opposed to part of the initial distribution of the nation's resources. In
this context, although there may be no logical brake on egalitarian
claims, powerful political coalitions will feel perfectly justified in fighting redistribution that threatens to "take" their "legitimately" held
property and give it to those who may need but do not deserve it.
An alternative response to the claim that private property entails
inequality might focus on the enormous ambiguity in the property
concept. After all, property rights prototypically contain the right to
exclude, the right to transfer, the right to bequeath, and even the right
to destroy. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe exactly
when alteration or circumscription of these rights will destroy the essence of a private property system, tremendous opportunities exist for
government action that embraces broad notions of private property
while simultaneously reflecting distributional concems. 4 Proponents
3. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 283-305 (1985) (arguing that the Constitution's protection of private property bars all
redistributive taxes); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 168-70 (1974) (criticizing redistributive taxation as forced labor). But see Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 743 (1986) (criticizing Epstein's argument).
4. Nor must the legal system limit itself to distributional considerations after establishing a
generalized property system. As Professor Singer has argued powerfully, distributional concerns,
such as a desire to protect the more vulnerable party, are often built into the rules that establish
property rights in the first instance. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv.
611, 663-701 (1988).
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of rent control, for example, frequently contend that, although the
landlord as owner has the right to lease her property and receive a
reasonable return,· she may not claim a property right to charge any
rent she pleases. Indeed, the plausibility (if not the success) of institutions like rent control may suggest that prerogatives of the wealthy are
more vulnerable to contextual attack than to bold conceptual challenges to the hegemony of private property. 5
A bold challenge, however, is precisely what Professor Jeremy
Waldron appears to have in mind. In his thoughtful, tightly reasoned
book The Right to Private Property, Professor Waldron develops perhaps the most powerful response to the claim that private property
entails unlimited inequality. He denies it. Indeed, he goes further.
Waldron argues that the strongest rights-based arguments supporting
a private property system make sense otily if every citizen is assured a
certain amount of property. Thus, Waldron concludes, private property's most coherent supporters are those who take distributional considerations deeply to heart.
Waldron begins by locating his work within the rights tradition
and explicitly disavowing any analysis of utilitarian claims that private
property spurs economic growth (pp. 5-12). Thus, Waldron seeks to
demonstrate that "there is no right-based argument to be found which
provides an adequate justification for a society in which some people
have lots of property and many have next to none" (p. 5). Accordingly, the most interesting questions raised by The Right to Private
Property involve Waldron's effort to reinvigorate the rights tradition as
an ally of egalitarian goals.
This task involves several intellectual hurdles. Most fundamentally, Waldron must convince us of both the coherence and usefulness
of the concept of rights and of the meaningful possibility of speaking
of one right to private property as opposed to many different individual rights over resources, such as the right to use, the right to exclude,
the right to transfer, and the like. From there, Waldron must proceed
to persuade us of the deep-seated errors in conservative theories of
property rights that base ownership on principles of acquisition and
ignore distributional concerns. Finally, Waldron must demonstrate
that his preferred rights-based approaches to property demand egalitarian conclusions and that a workable property system could in fact
afford sufficient private control over resources to be called private
while simultaneously containing the necessary limits on private transactions to ensure relative distributional equity.
5. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist seems persuaded that government has the power to regulate
rents. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1988). In his words, the rent-control
scheme upheld in Pennell "represents a rational attempt to accommodate the conflicting interests
of protecting tenants from burdensome rent increases while at the same time ensuring that landlords are guaranteed a fair return on their investment." 485 U.S. at 13.
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Wonderfully, Waldron forthrightly recognizes each of these challenges and explicitly confronts the difficult issues they raise. Better
still, Waldron's arguments are everywhere intelligent and often highly
persuasive. Indeed, nowhere is Waldron more convincing than in his
critique of rights-based theories, such as Robert Nozick's, that profess
to defend private property as a moral and ethical bar to governmental
efforts to achieve even minimal distributional equity. 6 As a result,
critics of rights-based theories have as much reason to study Waldron's particular arguments as do those who are sympathetic to a
rights approach.
At root, however, Waldron seeks to do more than refute certain
defenses of private property. Although he does not explicitly argue for
private property (p. 443), Waldron offers the hope that rights-based
property theory, rather than more skeptical or more radical traditions,
holds the most promise for moving Western societies toward more
equal distributions of wealth. Because Waldron so skillfully argues
that a rights-based approach demands redress for the propertyless, his
work poses a cogent challenge to those who would abandon the entire
property rights tradition as inevitably linked to intellectual efforts to
placate the powerful.7 If Waldron is correct, progressive scholars
might wish to soften their traditional hostility toward invocation of
property rights. Accordingly, after canvassing Waldron's arguments, 8
this review will focus on Waldron's efforts to resuscitate rights-based
theories of property. The review's conclusion is that although Waldron presents a very clear and extraordinarily sophisticated analysis of
property rights, 9 he fails to persuade progressive readers that his brand
6. For Nozick's views, see R. NOZICK, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 'fExAs L. REv. 1363, 1384-94 (1984) (arguing
that rights talk may be harmful to "the party of humanity"); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 'fExAs
L. REV. 1417, 1422 (1984) (suggesting that the Left can resuscitate rights talk provided that
rights are reconceptualized as something other than individual property).
8. Because Waldron's arguments are so well done and because the book itself is lengthy and
technical, considerable attention will be devoted here to sketching Waldron's views. This project
necessarily involves a certain amount of oversimplification, but one glaring omission in this review demands comment. A great deal of Waldron's book consists of painstakingly close textual
analyses of Locke and Hegel as exemplars of contrasting property rights theories. These chapters
alone constitute a considerable intellectual achievement, and a complete analysis of The Right to
Private Property would contain some assessment of Waldron's success at capturing the essence of
these theorists. Many readers, including this one, however, will accept Waldron's implicit invitation to view the discussions of Locke and Hegel chiefly as building blocks in Waldron's more
universal claim that rights-based arguments for private property produce relatively egalitarian
conclusions.
9. Despite its outstanding clarity, Waldron's book will not appeal to a wide audience oflawyers or scholars. His approach is exhaustive and he tackles too many arcane points to maintain
the interest of less than a devoted reader. Indeed, one noteworthy point in this regard is the
book's lack of substantive footnotes. Although legal writing is often criticized for being footnote
heavy, this reader found the requirement that every argument appear in text made it difficult to
separate main points from minor ones.
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of rights theory provides enough answers for those whose primary
goal is redressing economic inequality.
One additional point must be noted at the outset. For many readers of The Right to Private Property, Professor Waldron's failure to
consider utilitarian defenses of private property will constitute a fatal
flaw. It is surprising, for example, that Waldron provides no response
to the common view that private property is necessary to encourage
talented individuals to work hard and thereby produce a larger social
pie. 1° For if this common view is correct, a governmental focus on the
distribution of wealth risks so undermining private initiative as to diminish the absolute shares of those at the bottom, even as the government seeks to help them. Thus, a complete case against the
inequalities within our private property system would have to include
some analysis of the overall resource levels likely to be obtained under
different property systems. Nor will it do simply to highlight the massive difficulties that proponents of trickle-down economics will face in
demonstrating empirically how private property yields a larger social
pie or why efforts to divide the pie more fairly will significantly diminish total resources. For precisely the same empirical difficulties will
confront efforts to demonstrate that relatively egalitarian systems
won't severely shrink total output.
It would be unfair, however, to dismiss Waldron's work for failing
to come to grips with consequentialist arguments about the role of
private property in enhancing aggregate wealth. Waldron's explicit
goal is to explore "whether there are any good right-based arguments
for private property" (p. 3), and he means to distinguish rights-based
arguments from the utilitarian tradition. Moreover, Waldron's work
is more than sufficiently ambitious in its own terms. Finally, Waldron
at least hints at his reasons for rejecting utilitarian theories (pp. 12-13).
He suggests that utilitarian calculations too easily allow the gains of
one person to compensate for the losses of another, even where the
loser's suffering cannot be justified using separate criteria of justice.
Moreover, he is suspicious of sophisticated forms of utilitarianism that
seek to defend rule-following or individual rights on grounds of utility
alone. Waldron doubts such theories can resolve the problem of unjust trade-offs without abandoning utilitarian theory altogether. Accordingly, Waldron has candidly provided a road map for utilitarians
who wish to take issue with his approach. This review leaves that
utilitarian challenge to others. As noted above, the concern here is
whether Waldron is persuasive on his own terms. In that regard, however, Waldron's inability to keep his focus on rights theory wholly sep10. That this view is common does not make it true. For a convincing demonstration that
efficiency claims are heavily dependent on empirical assumptions and that under some conditions
rational individuals might produce more in nonprivate property regimes, see Kennedy &
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 717-20 (1980).
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arate from utilitarian concerns will constitute a subtheme of this
review.
I.

MOVING RIGHTS TO THE LEFT

Professor Waldron's analysis of rights-based arguments for private
property begins with the invaluable insight that private property's defenders often confuse two distinct intellectual claims. One well-recognized defense of private property, which Waldron explores through
discussions of Locke and Nozick, bases the purported owner's claim
on actions the owner has taken with respect to the resources over
which she now claims ownership. To take the classic example, a
farmer who encloses and cultivates previously unowned land may assert a right to the land as a result of the actions she has taken and the
labor she has invested. Waldron refers to arguments for a right to
private property based on such contingent actions taken by the claimant as special rights arguments.11
A second type of argument on behalf of a right to private property
focuses on the role property can play in facilitating some moral or
developmental interests of the individual. 12 Thus, an advocate of private property might argue that people need property to form autonomous judgments without regard to economic dependence on others, to
gain practical wisdom from bearing the consequences of choices concerning the resources under one's control, or simply to assert more
fully one's will over the material world. 13 The crucial point about
11. Pp. 115-17. For a useful analogy, Waldron asks that we consider the idea of contract
rights. My right that you keep your promise to me arises only after you have engaged in the
contingent event of making the promise. No promise, no contract right. Similarly, special rights
arguments supporting a claim to own a specific resource arise only after the claimant has taken
actions (analogous to the promise) concerning those resources. P. 109.
12. In a fine chapter (pp. 284-322), Waldron considers a wide-ranging array of arguments for
why human interests would be served by private property. He notes that priyate property might
be defended as the best way to ensure the maximum liberty for each that is consistent with eq'ual
liberty for all, and that private property might be singled out as a way of defending economic
liberty as a primary liberty in accord with some hierarchical ranking. Pp. 290-98. He is most
concerned, however, with arguments that private property is necessary so that an individual
might develop into a truly ''free man." P. 298. (Waldron apologizes for sexist terminology in
the acknowledgements. P. viii.).
Waldron does not mean to focus here on the idea that people need material resources to
survive. As he correctly notes, material resources can be provided by private, collective, or common property regimes. Pp. 351-52. Rather, Waldron is concerned with the role private property
plays in moral and ethical development. Occasionally, however, he pushes this point too far and
the reader wonders whether it is fair to belittle "the familiar banality that it is a mockery to offer
civil and political freedom to a starving man" while embracing the assertedly more profound
point "that being a free man positively requires some degree of material security, since without it
one would never have the opportunity to exercise the reflection, restraint, and control that constitutes an autonomous life." P. 306.
13. Waldron's chapter canvassing these arguments and others thoroughly debunks a common misconception. He notes that people often talk as though defenders of private property are
logically committed to a limited government that protects only the citizens' so-called "negative
liberty" to be free from external restraints. On this misguided view, once the government acknowledges that economic dependence threatens liberty almost as severely as more traditional
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these arguments is that they rely not on the already completed actions
of any individual but rather on the mere status of personhood. 14 Waldron refers to them as general rights arguments.
Waldron uses the distinction between special rights and general
rights arguments as the fulcrum for his distributional concerns (p.
117). As an initial matter, he favors general rights arguments for private property because they suggest private property is worth defending
even if no citizens have taken any specific actions, such as appropriation, that would give rise to property claims (pp. 284-90). More important, Waldron illustrates how arguments that property serves an
individual's moral interest push in the direction of affording property
to every individual so as to satisfy that moral interest. While special
rights arguments may suggest that citizens who have not performed
the required acquisitive actions (the nonindustrious?) deserve no property, general rights arguments appear coherent only as they assert why
everyone needs private property. After all, if I need private property
to develop into a moral being, presumably, so do you. Accordingly,
Waldron's attempt to demonstrate the egalitarian component of the
property right hinges on his preference for general rights arguments.
A.

The Negative Case

Because Waldron concedes that a successful special rights argument on behalf of private property might lead to a defense of massive
inequality, Waldron's first task is to explain why special rights arguments for property cannot succeed. 15 What makes this portion of his
book so interesting is that Waldron's own commitment to rights-based
arguments prevents him from resorting to more skeptical criticisms of
rights-based arguments for private property. Thus, in the absence of
divine revelation, one problem with special rights arguments is that
the special rights proponent appears to have invented the right and is
forms of coercion, then the government must abandon private property in favor of collective or
socialist systems. As Waldron correctly notes, however, some ideas of positive liberty, such as
the idea that people need private property to develop into "free" ethical beings, support private
property notions. Waldron later acknowledges that it may not be possible to maintain a private
property system, including free transfer of resources, that will not eventually result in some citizens being so impoverished as to be left with nothing but negative liberty. He is right, however,
that liberal rights theorists are free to make the case for private property even while admitting
that economic domination risks undermining the very goals private property is established to
advance.
14. For the pathbreaking exploration of how current property law does and should recognize
property's contribution to personhood, see Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. RBv.
957 (1982).
15. Waldron carefully distinguishes between special rights theories like Locke's, which are
qualified by a more general right to material resources necessary for subsistence, and special
rights theories like Nozick's, which are more weakly qualified. Waldron challenges Locke for
failing to draw an adequate connection between an individual's labor and his claim to ownership,
but Waldron acknowledges that some theory like Locke's might someday succeed. His true
target is more Nozickian theories that have strong anti-egalitarian consequences. His critique of
those theories is pursued in the text.
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vulnerable to the claim that she has merely attached the rights label to
her own view of political organization. 16 This challenge does not capture Waldron's attention, however, for he seems quite comfortable
with the idea that the proponent's arguments in favor of a special right
should stand and fall on the merits. The question, in Waldron's view,
is whether the rights proponent can present a cogent argument that a
particular interest of an individual is sufficiently important that others
are under a duty to respect it.17 Accordingly, Waldron does not criticize special rights arguments on the grounds that rights theory is unable to confront the obvious questions of where rights come from, who
defines them, and how they will be enforced. Waldron is instead unhappy with the answers special rights arguments provide.
The chief weakness of special rights arguments for private property, Waldron contends, is that there is no easy way to explain why the
unilateral actions of one individual should impose duties on others
(pp. 253-83). Waldron correctly notes that ownership claims cannot
be limited to claims about the owner's relationship to the owned ob-.·
ject. Rather, ownership entails the further claim that other persons
must not interfere with the owner's use of the object (p. 267). But
how, Waldron asks, can actions I take in appropriating an object impose duties on others to refrain from using it, particularly if they need
that object to fulfill their own moral duties, such as feeding their families (p. 268)? More generally, Waldron wonders, how can we justify
the state coercion necessary to enforce special rights-based property
rights when propertyless citizens have not actually consented to spe16. Similarly, special rights arguments could be criticized for granting the special rights proponent the power of defining the scope of rights she herself has invented.
17. Pp. 84-90. Waldron's view here raises a deep methodological problem. For it is fair to
ask what sort of arguments could possibly justify the claini that a person has a right to anything.
If, for example, one seeks to justify a right to property for appropriators of unclainied land, one
argument might be that the economy will perform better when the state recognizes and rewards
individual effort. But, as Waldron acknowledges (p. 202), this sort of argument risks blurring
rights·talk with utilitarianism because the rights proponent must defend private property with
consequentialist arguments even as she disavows consequentialism as the root of her political
theory. Alternatively, an advocate of a right to private property might assert that one who has
labored on unowned land should have a right to keep the land because she deserves it. But this
approach simply pushes the question back, leaving it for the rights theorist to explain why the
laborer deserves the land or more generally to find a source for claims of moral desert that is
neither religious (and thus outside the bounds of secular debate) nor consequentialist (and thus
ultimately utilitarian in its outlook).
As noted in the text, Waldron seeks to buttress his rights analysis against this collapse into
other forms of reasoning by asking the reader to consider only whether the asserted right corresponds to an interest of the individual strong enough that others should be under a duty to
respect it. P. 87. One problem here is that there is no ready scale on which to measure the
strength of interests, thus there is always the danger of sliding into consequentialist phrases like
"his interest is strong enough to be a right because everyone would be better off if we treated it
that way." Ultimately, however, the real question for Waldron's rights approach is whether he
can explain what it means for an individual's interest to become strong enough to earn the
designation of individual right. In other words, when will my needing something like free speech
become an obligation upon others to either provide me a chance to speak or at least not obstruct
my efforts? See infra Section II.A.
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cial rights property rules and hypothetical citizens forming a state
would be reluctant to agree to rules that could result in their being
morally and legally bound to starve rather than take what their neighbors have appropriated?1 8
Waldron's points here are well taken. As he correctly maintains,
special rights arguments for private property differ from a special
rights approach to contract law (p. 267). In contracts, a person can
arguably become obligated to perform a promise as a result of the contingent action of promising. But, in contracts, the act of promising
binds the promisor so that she arguably created her own obligation.
In contrast, the special rights approach demands that the contingent
actions of the appropriator or creator alone prohibit others from using
the claimed resource. Waldron is right that such a result confounds
our typical moral notions of individual obligation. 19
18. Waldron's question here builds on John Rawls' classic work A Theory of Justice, J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JurncE (1971). See pp. 271-78 (explicitly relying on Rawls). Like
Rawls, Waldron argues that one crucial component in assessing the validity of a political theory
(here a theory of property rights) is the extent to which those who might agree to the theory
without regard to its impact on their particular circumstances will be able to adhere to the theory
once faced with its adverse effects. This is certainly a legitimate question.
Waldron's resort to the contractarian tradition, however, raises doubts about the nature of
his commitment to the rights approach endorsed throughout the book. Since Waldron stresses
that every theory has foundational aspects from which its other conclusions may be derived (p.
64), the reader wonders whether Waldron's arguments for rights are indeed foundational or
whether Waldron's real test for validity is whether a particular notion of property can be justified
within the Rawlsian framework of hypothetical social contract. See generally R. UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 13 (1986) (noting ways in which rights theorists often
vacillate' between rights-based and consensus-based justifications).
Waldron may believe that such a substantial overlap exists here as to create few problems.
After all, Rawls argues strenuously for a theory of justice that recognizes the primacy of individual political rights. J. RAWLS, supra, 228-34, 541-48. But as Waldron recognizes later in the
book (pp. 398-408), rights theorists like Nozick fear that Rawlsian analysis may eviscerate rights
by failing to recognize that certain rights, such as the right to one's body, should be outside
collective debate. Waldron skillfully demonstrates that the specter of forced kidney transplants
(from old to young?) does nothing to support a property right to external resources. Establishing
a cooperative regime that limits one's ability to exercise talents so as to gamer personal wealth
hardly amounts to coercive dissection. But Nozick's deeper point involves the difficulty of hold·
ing on to the primacy of individual concerns when the evaluative standard is the hypothetical
agreement of every member of the collective. Cf. Stick, Turning Rawls Into Nozick and Back
Again, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 363, 377 (1987) (wondering why hypothetical citizens discussing
property rights in a Rawlsian original position couldn't read Nozick's book and appreciate its
merits). Why, in other words, doesn't contractarian analysis offer the supposed contracting parties the possibility of agreeing to measure gains to some against losses to others in ways similar to
those that lead Waldron to reject utilitarianism?
19. The case of the father's care and concern creating a duty on his child to honor him
perhaps suggests we have some familiarity with obligations not engendered by individual action.
Waldron rightly assumes, however, that traditional rights theory contemplates application to a
broad array of arms-length transactions outside the familial context. But cf. R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 195-202 (1986) (discussing ways in which people might acquire obligations because of their role as members in a community rather than as a result of individual actions on
their part). Moreover, special rights arguments for property unqualified by more general rules
guaranteeing minimal income appear to allow property-holding members of the community to
exclude the propertyless from crucial material resources. It is difficult to imagine why the prop•
ertyless would wish to enter into such a community much less how community obligations could
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Moreover, Waldron also correctly highlights problems with contractarian justifications of special rights arguments based on principles
of acquisition. One familiar co~dition of a political theory based on a
hypothetical social ·contract is that the parties who supposedly enter
into this contract care deeply about their ability to comply with it for
reasons other than fear of being caught cheating. But a social contract
that incorporates special rights-based property rules may demand that
the parties who fail to engage in the actions necessary to acquire property respect the property rights of others even if this means starving to
death. Since people might never reasonably be expected to comply
with a property system ,that compels their extinction, Waldron concludes, there is no basis to accept any special rights property system
that puts rights gained through actions like appropriation or labor
ahead of material need. 20 We might still wish to consider a theory of
special rights property rights qualified by a more general right to material resources necessary for a minimal existence, but such theories
would support rather than refute Waldron's underlying claims. 21
Rights-based arguments for private property, he argues, cannot support property as a bar to more basic goals of distributive justice.
Those who believe otherwise will have no choice but to confront Waldron's well-reasoned views.
somehow give rise to a duty to respect property acquired by the unilateral actions specified in the
special rights theory.
·
20. Perhaps because of his hostility to utilitarianism, Waldron never convincingly explains
why parties to his hypothetical contract might not find the total economic gains from a private
property system so great as to warrant adopting a system that risks placing a few propertyless
citizens in a position where they could not reasonably be expected to obey the law. The contracting parties might then assume that the state's coercive sanctions will fill the role left open by
the more desirable voluntary compliance. There would, of course, be costs to abandoning the
moral clarity of a system where no one is purposefully relegated to the role of outlaw. But
Waldron's own commitment to measuring costs and benefits only when assessing the justification
of a particular individual right renders it virtually impossible to compare the costs of a less
elegant political system against the costs of a property system that might produce a smaller pie.
21. The possibility of qualifications to the special rights-based theory that would permit exceptions for those in need greatly complicates the topic here. As Waldron recognizes, a special
rights theory might escape his criticism if it refused to permit acquisition of unowned resources
in ways that would bind the propertyless to respect others property rights at the expense of their
own survival. But Waldron insists that the exception here must be a strong one that "never'.'
authorizes property rights to bar the claims of those in need. P. 281. A more absolute special
rights theory must fail, Waldron contends, because it could not command the allegiance of those
expected to obey it. Accordingly, Waldron concludes that a special rights theory might satisfy
his concerns if it contained the proviso traditionally (although Waldron believes incorrectly)
attributed to Locke that would prohibit appropriation of unowned resources unless there were
"enough and as good" resources left over. So too would a special rights theory made subservient
to a general right to material resources necessary for subsistence. In contrast, Waldron rejects
Nozick's more limited conception in which acquisition would be forbidden only when the appropriation left others in a worsened condition as a result of losing the chance to use the appropriated resources and only after taking into account indirect benefits of an appropriative system.
Pp. 280-81.
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B. The Affirmative Case
Having completed his case against special rights arguments, Waldron turns to the considerably more difficult tasks pf exploring general
rights-based arguments for private property, suggesting how they
might succeed, and illustrating their substantially egalitarian components. He suggests, for example, that people might be more independent with private property and that private property might encourage
people to develop the prudence necessary to care for their own resources. Although it would be difficult wholly to refute these possible
advantages, the important question is whether the obvious gains from
individualized control over certain parts of the material world justify
adopting a political system in which individuals have a right to something called private property.
1. Defining Private Property
Waldron deserves significant credit for taking very seriously the
burden of justifying his preference for rights-talk and his defense of
private property. More important, he offers intriguing suggestions
around conventional objections. Consider first the familiar possibility
that private property is too ambiguous a concept upon which to build
a political theory. Suppose, for example, that the legal system gives
me the right to ride a particular horse and to exclude you from doing
so, but does not permit me to transfer that right to anyone else. Do I
own the horse? If the answer is an unqualified yes, then the right to
transfer has been disaggregated from the traditional bundle of property rights, and even the successful defense of this disaggregated private property system would fail to justify the majority of our current
practices involving private control over material resources. 22
There are problems too, however, with an unqualified no. Waldron and many serious thinkers wish to avoid the sort of conceptualism that would link private ownership to a single list of designated
attributes. 23 After all, can we really say, for example, that an allocation system that permits unlimited bequests differs so greatly from one
that forbids bequests above a certain amount that only the former deserves to be called a private property system? If not, and if the unlimited right to bequeath is not essential to private property, what is?
Indeed, perhaps it makes no sense to talk about private property at all.
Maybe greater understanding would be achieved if lawyers concentrated only on the different rights often associated with private prop22. For an explanation of how proliferating definitio.ns of property challenge property's role
as an ideological linchpin in defenses of and attacks on contemporary capitalism, see Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69-82 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1980).
23. P. 30. See generally Radin, The Consequences of Conceptua/ism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv.
239 (1986) (exploring weaknesses of conceptualism within Richard Epstein's property theory).
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erty, e.g., the right to exclude, the right to transfer, and so on, without
attempting to combine them into a single "private property"
package. 24
The trick then for proponents of private property is to explain how
the various rights private property might be thought to entail can be
accumulated into a meaningful concept of property without having to
defend the idea that there is only one bundle of rights consistent with a
private property system. Waldron does this rather nicely. He argues
first that people need the broad contrast between private property, collective property, and common property as a method for organizing
their understanding of day-to-day life. It is unrealistic, he suggests, to
expect ordinary citizens to master a whole set of detailed rules concerning control over resources without reference to a single "organizing idea" such as private property. 25 Moreover, "organizing ideas"
are more likely to be a focal point for the societal consensus necessary
to legitimate the legal system (p. 43). On this view, it is plausible to
describe citizens as endorsing private property as a general idea, but
implausible to expect agreement on each of its constituent parts. Accordingly, Waldron sees a vital role for the idea of private property in
political discussion.
At the same time, however, Waldron carefully stresses the difficulties of identifying a single list of factors that would form necessary and
sufficient conditions for private ownership (p. 30). He wants to say
that systems that allow bequests and systems that don't could both be
fairly characterized as private property systems. To do this, he borrows and adapts the distinction between a concept of private property
and various conceptions of private property falling within the con.:.
cept. 26 The idea here is that people can discuss questions of allocation
of resources at a level of abstraction at which they all agree to be comparing private property systems with other broad general concepts
such as common or collective property. This is so even if the discussion's participants cannot agree on precisely which characteristics
mark out a private property system. Thus, there might be agreement
about the meaningfulness of the concept of private property even if
there is disagreement over the, details, or as Waldron would put it,
24. See Grey, supra note 22, at 73 ("It seems fair to conclude from a glance at the range of
current usages that the specialists who design and manipulate the legal structures of the advanced capitalist economies could easily do without using the term 'property' at all.").
25. Pp. 42-43. Waldron builds here on Bruce Ackerman's contrast between social property
- ownership claims that can be easily defended as consistent with social practice - and legal
property - ownership claims whose validity frequently must be established by lawyers. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-18, 156-67 (1977).
26. Pp. 52-53. For earlier uses of the concept/conception distinction, see J. RAWLS, supra
note 18, at 5-11 (competing conceptions of justice); R. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 70-71 (competing conceptions of courtesy). Waldron fully acknowledges his debt to Rawls and Dworkin.
P. 52.
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even if there are competing conceptions of private pI'operty. 27 Accordingly, Waldron concludes, private property is a coherent concept
that can resist efforts to break it into its component parts but is not a
uniform concept that prohibits disagreement over concrete issues involving the allocation of resources.
Although Waldron's balancing act here works well as a vehicle for
focusing attention away from definitional disputes and toward the reasons why individuals should or should not control material resources,
the risks of relying on some collective understanding of private property should not be overlooked. Waldron is probably correct when he
relies on the human psychological tendency to "organize" affairs
through a few general principles rather than to memorize a set of subrules. Even here, though, the reader wonders whether Waldron hasn't
resorted to a consequentialist point to support his conclusion. For
presumably the need to respect underlying cognitive structures stems
from some notion that this will improve collective organization. 28
But, if consequentialism runs so deep as to structure our decisions on
which concepts are true (Le., those that appeal to our need for an "organizing idea"), can we really avoid consequentialist evaluations of
property systems based on their effects on overall wealth?
More important, one wonders whether private property is a functioning or a desirable organizing idea.29 There does seem to be some27. It is tricky to see how the parties might agree on the concept of private property but not
be able to specify its component parts. They .:night instead simply agree to omit the disputed
aspects, such as the right to bequeath, but coalesce around core attributes of private property like
the right to exclude. But, following Wittgenstein, Waldron fairly reminds us that humans often
have the ability to identify "family resemblances" without relying on a set of uniform characteristics. Waldron's colorful example points out that we might easily recognize a particular member
of the Churchill family to have a Churchill face even if she lacks the Churchillian Roman nose.
P. 50.
28. It would be possible for Waldron to defend his reliance upon psychological principles by
claiming to be describing reality and denying the need to appeal to normative principles that
transcend description. Nothing in his book, however, suggests a desire to blur the traditional
distinction between descriptive and prescriptive reasoning. For recent efforts to use cognitive
theory to challenge that distinction, see Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 639 (1990), and works cited therein.
29. It is intriguing that Waldron's notion of an "organizing idea" turns the discussion away
from the idea of justification that otherwise forms the central preoccupation of his book. Don't
citizens who use private property as an "organizing idea" need to know not only who owns what
but why they own it? If so, then the idea of private property as such may be too abstract to
constitute a viable organizing idea.
Moreover, even if one accepts, as Waldron argues, that there may be a strong general rights
argument on behalf of private property, that argument will say little about the content of the
property rules. It may, as Waldron suggests, point away from rules that give a lot to some and
virtually nothing to others. But general rights arguments do not clearly connect up specific
individuals with specific goods. Rather, they support the view that once ownership rules are
established, courts should protect them against neighborly and governmental intrusion. Perhaps
this is why property's defenders have a tendency to adopt special rights arguments that would
award first possessors an interest in what they have appropriated. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 217. Waldron is right that such arguments are different in character from the general
rights arguments he wishes to defend. But maybe this means that as it now stands people really
believe in conflicting justifications of private property and that the concept is in fact a poor
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thing slightly patronizing about the argument that although those who
have thought seriously about property see problems in rendering the
concept coherent, we nonetheless need to hold on to the idea of private
property to satisfy the limited conceptual abilities of the ordinary citizen. Moreover, isn't it extraordinarily likely that people permitted to
fend off complexity by citing a need for an "organizing idea" will also
latch on to the kind of conceptualism that Waldron's own work struggles creditably against? Indeed, those skeptical about defining private
property have reason to fear that the psychological need for a simplified organizing idea will allow the idea of private property to serve
precisely the ideological agenda Waldron sets out to challenge. Waldron says little about why people's cognitive need for simplifying principles won't push them toward the unjustified view that law's role is to
define and defend a single set of rights constituting the property system. Nor does he allay our fears that the set of rights people will settle
on will just happen to be that which protects the rich against government focus on fair distributions of wealth.
Waldron hopes instead to defeat conservative ideology by defining
private property broadly enough to include many different views on
distributional questions. But there are problems too in avoiding efforts
to disaggregate the property concept through use of the concept/conception distinction. The distinction depends upon carefully separating
the points of agreement (on the concept) from the points of disagreement (competing conceptions). In specifying the grounds of agreement, however, the author of the distinction risks foreclosing
alternative points of view by defining them out of the game. Suppose,
for example, that one person believes the right to exclude is at the core
of private property so that any system that failed to include this would
not really be a private property system. Another might find this view
nonsense, pointing to the existence of cases in American law where
owners are forced to permit others onto their land. 30 Do these disputants still share a concept of private property such that they are merely
arguing over competing conceptions? If not, then the defender, let's
say, of the right to exclude, risks using her definition of private property as a way of cutting off debate about the rules concerning
exclusion. 31
"organizing idea." See Paul, supra note 3. For further work on the idea that current property
law in fact reflects allegiance to two different concepts of property, see J. Paul, The Hidden
Structure of Takings Law (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
30. See. e.g., State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971) (finding that trespass laws do
not forbid health and legal professionals from entering a private farm, over the owner's objections, to render aid to migrant workers); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980) (rejecting federal "takings" challenge to California court decision that its state constitution's free speech guarantees required shopping center owners to grant access to students gathering petition signatures).
31. Waldron recognizes this in a similar discussion concerning the right to bequeath. Pp. 5051.
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But if both parties do share a concept of property, then the concept
must be pushed to a still more abstract level, as Waldron does when he
suggests that a private property system necessarily entails little more
than a scheme whereby individuals have the final say over what is
done with certain material resources. 32 This level of abstraction, however, contains further risks. Even when resources are collectively or
commonly owned, for example, there will be designated individuals
who have final say over who can use a particular resource. Consider ,
the lifeguard who decides where beachgoers may swim. Thus, as Waldron recognizes, more communal systems will also contain subrules
about who can use what resources and when (p. 41).
It is tricky, however, to distinguish these subrules from the property rules in a private property system. Waldron presumably would
concede that people in a private property system have "final" say over
use of resources only because the collective has adopted a private
property system. 33 Thus, private property systems are faced with the
inevitable task of both inventing and changing the property rules.
Similarly, even collectivist regimes have no choice but to assign some
decisionmaking authority to individuals (imagine a plebiscite on
whether I can eat an apple for lunch today). Accordingly, the real
debate might best be described as over which types of delegations are
desirable rather than over which organizing principle the society
adopts. Waldron is surely right that people now prefer first to settle
the seemingly broader issue of the society's general orientation, but
this may be a cultural artifact rather than a way of advancing
32. P. 39. Waldron states that "[i]n a private property system, a rule is laid down that, in the
case of each object, the individual person whose name is attached to that object is to determine
how the object shall be used and by whom." P. 39. This definition, of course, does not settle
matters such as whether my decision to give you something on condition you use it in certain
ways leaves the object with no clear individual owner and thus no longer a subject of private
property. See Grey, supra note 22, at 70.
Waldron does address, however, the obvious problem that no system of law could ever give
individuals final say over how resources are used. I might be said to own my car, for example,
but no one would stiggest that I can use it to run you down. Waldron contepds the rules protecting pedestrians are more appropriately classed as rules of conduct rather than property rules. As
he puts it, "The specific function of property rules is to determine, once we have established that
bicycles may be ridden, who is entitled to ride which bicycle when." P. 33. One classic property
issue, however, seems to be whether I can ride my bicycle across your land. See Preseault v.
Interstate Commerce Commn., 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990) (refusing to entertain claim by holders of.
reversionary interest that government unconstitutionally took their property by authorizing use
of railroad rights of way for recreational trails). Indeed, property law has no choice but to
grapple not only with who will decide how resources are used but with what decisions people
may make. Moreover, the disputed issues Waldron considers, such as whether an owner may
transfer a resource, appear to involve rules of conduct rather than allocational decisions. It is
unclear then whether Waldron's abstract definition marks out a concept of private property with
sufficient completeness for the reader to identify private property as a functioning system to
contrast with other approaches.
33. Although Waldron defends individual rights, he does not describe these rights as natural
or preexisting the state. Accordingly, his willingness to accept the burden of justifying rights
from the perspective of winning collective agreement compels him to defend private property as a
collective invention.
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discussion. 3 4
At root, the combination of the "organizing idea" defense of a concept of private property with the concept/conception distinction
threatens to overlook the main point of those who argue that private
property tends to break down into a series of rights rather than standing as an overarching principle. Definitional skeptics contend that private property works as an "organizing idea" precisely because it relies
on a particular conception of property. Waldron readily acknowledges, for example, that private property would not work as an "organizing idea," if ownership meant you could keep things you
purchased and were given to you, unless someone else showed a
greater need for them. But how can we decide whether such a system
would still be a private property system (hence within the concept as a
competing conception) or outside private property (perhaps because
the rules concerning neediness were now the true allocational guidelines)? If such a system is a private property regime, the arguments
for it might be expected to look different from those presently advanced to defend contemporary private property systems. Indeed, the
instability of such a system would threaten even a general rights argument stressing a person's need for control over resources. But if such
a system falls outside the concept of private property then certain substantive views have been smuggled into the concept in a way that risks
foreclosing political debate.
In sum, one strength of Waldron's book is the extent to which he
tackles definitional skepticism directly. He brings a clear, fresh description to the problem, and retains confidence that we can draw
strength from traditionally plain talk. At the same time, Waldron is
aware of complexity and indeed contributes to our understanding of
it. 35 The Right to Private Property, however, will not put an end to the
debate over whether private property is an intellectually as opposed to
rhetorically meaningful concept. One hopes Professor Waldron will
have more to say on the subject.
2.

The General Rights Approach

After confronting the dilemmas in defining property, Waldron's remaining task is to tame the beasts lurking in the thicket of rights analysis. 36 The questions are familiar. What does it mean to say a person
has a right to something? How do rights-based arguments differ from
other forms of political argument? Can rights conflict and what hap34. For the view that contemporary commitment to a general concept of private property
results from private property's role in the ideological and practical escape from feudalism, see
Grey, supra note 22, at 73-74.
35. Waldron's discussion beginning at page 26 would be a welcome addition to any set of
materials introducing the idea of property to first-year law students.
36. See generally Symposium: A Critique of Rights, 62 TEXAS L. R.E.v. 1363 (1984).
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pens if they do? Waldron must also answer the further questions arising from his claim that a general right to private property makes sense
only if everyone has some property.
Waldron tackles these questions with admirable precision. As
noted above, he carefully defines a right-based argument as one that
stresses why an individual's interest is strong enough that others are
under a duty to respect it (p. 87). One striking feature of this definition is that Waldron eschews reliance on claims of natural or divine
right. Thus, Waldron depends upon crafting arguments for individual
rights that will convince the many to respect the rights of the few or
the one. He does not, however, address the perplexing issues involving
the ultimate grounding of an argument for individual rights that appeals - as he seems to - to collective ratification. Consider two possibilities. The rights proponent may suggest to the group that a
particular right, e.g., the right to liberty, should be respected either
because some aspects of life would be better if it were or because recognition of the right would be consistent with the group's well-recognized allegiance to other ideals. 37
The first approach threatens a complex justificatory circle. An argument for a particular right that stresses gains to the right-holder
remains nonconsequentialist largely because the group's focus is held
to one right at a time. Thus, we are asked to consider the strength of
the individual's interest and not how respecting that interest functions
in maximizing the overall interests of the group. But why should we
consider only one interest at a time? In other words, how can we decide whether there is a right to liberty without simultaneously considering how a society that respected liberty would also be able to
guarantee security and other purported rights? One response is that
the group can make better decisions by considering one right at a time.
Again, though, we need to define "better." Ultimately, we need a normative standard to judge between the utilitarian and rights approaches, and we find this hard to achieve because rights-analysis and
utilitarianism constitute the principal justificatory elements we have
for building normative standards.
The second approach avoids the problem by appealing to an already recognized ideal whose justification must itself surmount the difficulties of the rights tradition. The interesting question here is how
the proponent of the asserted right argues for "consistency" with the
pre-established ideal. Ronald Dworkin has perhaps most eloquently
argued that inconsistent rules often deserve harsh condemnation as
37. The chosen phrase "some aspects of life" is deliberately ambiguous between some aspects
of group life and some aspects of the life of the individual who is claiming the right. The former
definition would suggest that rights are being justified largely in col\sequentialist terms and thus
run the risk of not being right-based arguments at all. The latter definition seems truer to Waldron's spirit but it raises the problem of crossing from the idea that the individual will gain from
the right to the idea that the group should actually recognize the right.
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"checkerboard solutions." 38 Consider a rule that a woman born between January and July has a right to an abortion, but one born between August and December does not. But· Dworkin has also
conceded that there are times when decisionmakers may rightly part
from consistency. Legislatures, for example, may extend a new rule of
tort liability to one industry before applying it equally to all. 39 The
problem then is that a theory of consistency alone can't tell us when
we must be consistent.
Suppose an opponent of Waldron's suggested right to private property agrees that it would be consistent with her idea of liberty to grant
the property right but that society already has enough liberty and
should now pursue other values. Waldron might reject her reference
to the needs of society as unfairly consequentialist. This seems rather
harsh, however, because consideration of which rights people have
must ultimately involve reference to the needs of others. After all,
Waldron's definition wants the right-holder's interest to be strong
enough so that others are under a duty to respect it. Alternatively,
Waldron might correctly insist that the property opponent have a
"principled" reason for giving up on liberty short of granting the argument for property. But rights theory alone cannot tell us what standards to use to determine which arguments are principled.40 Here
again we seek a normative standard to determine when consistency is
the prime value and when consistency might fairly be sacrificed in
favor of other goals. 41 In short, a full defense or even exploration of a
right to private property would have to go beyond mere demonstration
of private property's advantages to property holders. Readers would
need some clues concerning desirable methods for weighing these advantages against other values the reader holds equally dear.
Waldron, however, fairly chooses not to write about every problem
involved in achieving suitable normative standards. His immediate
goal is to achieve a definition of rights that is strict enough to distinguish rights talk from less individualistic forms of moral argument,
such a$ utilitarianism. Thus, he sees the emphasis on individual inter38. R DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 178-84.
39. Id. at 217-18.
40. For a general argument that rights theory is inadequate because it depends upon unargued-for legal and social contexts to give meaning to asserted rights, see Tushnet, supra note 7, at
1371-80.
41. The worship of consistency pervades Waldron's entire intellectual effort. He deserves
praise for demanding that defenders of private property be true to the arguments they raise.
Thus, Waldron argues that if a particular justification for private property, say personal independence, points in the direction of broad equality, then "the logic of justification" (p. 417) forces
the proponent of the justification either to support equality or abandon the justification. One
cannot but applaud Waldron's commitment to intellectual integrity while at the same time wishing he would acknowledge the extent to which intellectual consistency is difficult to achieve and
not necessarily the only test of the good faith of our intellectual opponents. See Boyle, Legal
Fiction, 38 HAsnNGS L.J. 1013, 1017-19 (1987) (reviewing R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986)) (criticizing Dworkin for falsely linking consistency with morality, justice and the good).
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est as distinct from a consequentialist focus on improving general welfare. 42 At the same time, Waldron wants to leave enough flexibility in
the idea of rights so that rights proponents will not necessarily be tied
to any particular view of political organization. Accordingly, he distinguishes the broad category of right-based arguments from more
narrow claims concerning which rights people are said to have (pp. 6263). So, for example, Waldron explains how people may disagree over
whether there is a right to a minimum income while recognizing that a
right-based argument for that income would stress an individual's
strong interest in receiving one. With this distinction, as with the distinction between concept and conception, Waldron hopes to steer a
course between skepticism (there are no rights, there is no such thing
as private property) and absolutism (there is only one set of rights,
there is only one true definition of property).
For many readers, Waldron's fine-tuned effort to carve a place for
rights-based analysis' will constitute a significant contribution.
Although Waldron explicitly builds on earlier work, 43 his clarity and
common sense present readers with an account of rights arguments
that captures their individualistic spirit without embracing moral dogmatism. Waldron explicitly acknowledges, for example, that individual rights will inevitably conflict and he recognizes that resolution of
such conflicts will be neither easy nor value-free (p. 77). At the same
time, Waldron's book does not attempt or achieve a complete theory
of rights. Readers will wish, for example, that Waldron said more
about what it is that makes an interest strong enough to place duties
on others. Readers would also benefit from Waldron's views on what
types of analysis will resolve rights conflicts.
C. Property and General Rights
Ultimately, the most interesting and controversial aspects of Waldron's embrace of rights (aspects that readers may lose sight of during
the somewhat tedious, early portions of the book) involve Waldron's
concrete application of his ideas to the problem of private property.
Waldron argues that if individuals do have a strong enough interest in
private property to warrant treating private property as a right, then
every individual has that interest and it cannot be satisfied by a system
where some people have no property at all. This flows from the fact
that most of the interests that Waldron asserts might be promoted by
42. Waldron acknowledges that utilitarianism is itself an individualistic philosophy since its
goal of maximizing general happiness arises from a desire to maximize the total satisfaction of
individuals. P. 73. He contends a rights-based approach is still more individualistic, however,
because it places certain interests of individuals (rights) outside the ordinary calculus and gener·
ally requires some form of apology, explanation, or repayment to be made to the holder of the
interest on those occasions when an interest is traded off against another. Pp. 78-79.
43. Waldron forthrightly acknowledges his debt to Ronald Dworkin (p. 64), Neil Mac·
Cormick (p. 79), Joseph Raz (pp. 79, 87), and H.L.A. Hart (p. 95).
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private property, such as the ability to exercise control over the material world, won't be satisfied unless the individual actually acquires
material resources. Moreover, in what is perhaps the book's best
chapter (pp. 390-422), Waldron convincingly explains why merely
granting people an opportunity to acquire property will not sufficiently
answer the egalitarian implications of many right-based arguments. 44
If people need property to form independent judgments, Waldron
points out, they need resources, not simply an opportunity to acquire
them (pp. 414-15).
Nor does the intuitively strong idea of self-ownership readily translate into a system that protects opportunities while ignoring results.
Even if one grants that a person is entitled to own herself and her
talents, Waldron maintains, this says nothing about what sort of social
structure should be created to govern the reaping of benefits from
those talents. As Waldron colorfully puts it, self-ownership no more
entitles a talented mineral prospector the opportunity to ply his trade
than it would entitle a talented apparatchik the opportunity to continue living under socialism (p. 407). Accordingly, Waldron concludes, it may be that some arguments support merely the opportunity
to acquire private property. A pseudo-Social Darwinism, for example,
might rest on the benefits of stiff competition to individual growth (pp.
421-22). But the vast majority of arguments supporting private property push beyond the point of equality of opportunity to the point
where the state must make some effort to ensure some equality of outcome.45 If people have a right to private property because they need
44. One particularly nice observation at the beginning of this chapter concerns what Waldron calls the "asymmetrical" character of familiar arguments involving property claims. P.
390. On one hand, Waldron notes, many take it for granted that the expropriation of tangible
resources owned by the rich constitutes a violation of the right to private property even if the
aggrieved person retains the opportunity to acquire additional property. On the other hand, it is
often assumed that a poor person's rights are satisfied if she retains the opportunity to acquire
property even if she actually has none. Of course, many explanations may exist for this apparent
anomaly. Uncompensated expropriations may' be inconsistent with the idea of private property.
Or, from a consequentialist perspective, expropriation may be seen to defeat the incentive-generating aspects of a private property system. But Waldron is wholly correct that the chameleonlike character of opportunity-based arguments is a problem that seldom receives the attention it
deserves.
45. In another fine section, Waldron describes the ideal of "equality of opportunity" as unstable. Pp. 415-18. He notes that the concerns that lead one to believe people need a good in
question, for example, education, are unlikely to be satisfied by a system that offers only an
opportunity to acquire that good. Thus, if we believe people will be more capable citizens if they
have a certain amount of wealth, we will want them to have that wealth and not merely an
opportunity to acquire it.
Waldron recognizes the possibility, however, that government handouts may defeat some of
the arguments on behalf of private property. If the reason for private property, for example, is to
encourage a sense of prudence and responsibility, that sense may be thwarted if the government
is ready to bail out those who squander material resources. P. 419. Thus, Waldron suggests,
government might be sensitive in its methods of achieving relative distributional equality, eschewing handouts in favor of limits on large bequests, efforts to foster home ownership, and
other alterations of the property framework. P. 420.
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property to satisfy some strong individual interest, Waldron insists,
everyone must have some.
One last problem, however, haunts Waldron's distributional conclusions. As he defines it, the concept of private property implies that
individuals have final say over the resources they own.46 But what
happens if owners, exercising their final say, choose to transfer resources to others in transactions that result in some persons owning
less than the minimal amount implied by general rights arguments for
private property? More concretely, Waldron asks, suppose someone
loses his shirt in a poker game (p. 423)? How will the legal system
dedicated to preserving some level of economic equality prevent the
disruptive transactions (bad bets, poor investments) without destroying the institution of private property that general rights arguments
apparently support? Similarly, how can a true system of private property prevent accumulations of wealth that result from voluntary transactions? As Robert Nozick asks us, how can a private property system
stop people from paying Wilt Chamberlain for his basketball talents? 47
Waldron takes this problem very seriously, noting that if the objection succeeds then the distributional implications of general rights arguments are themselves incoherent.48 In other words, if private
property necessitates a level of individual control over resources that
prevents governmental efforts to ensure that everyone has property,
then the familiar political roadblock to egalitarian claims returns.
Does it matter that our arguments for private property demand certain levels of equality, if in practice we can have private property or
equality but not both?
Waldron has no definitive answer. Not surprisingly, he invokes
both of the strategies suggested at the outset of this review. He notes
first that the concept of private property is one of many conceptions
and thus there is no logical link between private ownership and absolute right to transfer resources (p. 432). Accordingly, powers of transfer might be qualified by a well-recognized system of taxation designed
to maintain a wide distribution of property rights (p. 436). Similarly,
Waldron proposes that certain kinds of transfer simply be defined out
of the private property concept. Thus, he suggests that a system bar46. For obvious limits on the idea of "final say," see supra note 32.
47. R. NOZICK, supra note 3, at 161.
48. Pp. 431-32. Waldron discusses both a Nozickian and a Marxian version of the objection
to the egalitarian implications of general rights arguments for private property. Pp. 42~·31. The
Marxian claim is that the historical trend toward large-scale enterprises will inevitably cause
private property systems to concentrate wealth in fewer and fewer hands, leaving the great
masses of people without the private property that general rights arguments suggest they deserve.
Waldron correctly notes that extreme versions of this Marxian claim seem to leave no role for
independent assessment of the justice of present day institutions. On this view, we need simply
wait for the inevitable progress of history. P. 431. In the meantime, in case Marx was wrong, it
seems worth considering whether an egalitarian system of private property is conceptually possible even if it is historically hopeless.
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ring or trucing certain types of bequests might satisfy the main general
rights arguments for private property yet substantially eliminate one
source of inequality (pp. 435-36). Here Waldron makes explicit use of
the disaggregation of the property concept to argue that the propertyI
equality conflict is less severe than it seems. 49
But Waldron has not left us just where we started. For Waldron
has made a strong case that private property cannot be well defended
unless one makes a simultaneous commitment to ensuring that every
person has substantial resources. Progressive taxation and regulatory
schemes like rent control are not simply Waldron's idea of how to
limit the domain of private property. Rather, he views them as necessary to make good on the very justifications for private property that
he finds persuasive. Taken alone, reliance on progressive taxes threatens to shift the discussion to appropriate taxation levels and risks sacrificing the advantages of the frontal assault on nonegalitarian defenses
of private property. But Waldron wants the focus on taxation to be
part of the frontal assault. Similarly, efforts to carve up the traditional
bundle of property rights appear as blatant moves to achieve political
results, unless one always keeps in mind that each part of that bundle
must constantly be tested and judged against the background justifications for the private property system.
At bottom, it is this insistence on questioning justifications that
constitutes Waldron's most significant contribution. If it turns out
that we are persuaded that people have a right to private property to
facilitate their moral interests as commercial traders, Waldron agrees,
then we won't want a private property system that places stringent
limits on the right to transfer one's goods (p. 433). But if, as Waldron
suspects, our rationales for private property stem more from our interest in allowing people the necessary material resources to develop into
ethical beings, then Waldron concludes we have an obligation to shape
our conception of property to ensure that our underlying justification
is fulfilled. Whether or not Waldron's work is ultimately successful,
he is certainly correct about that.

II.

THE BURDEN OF RIGHTS-BASED THEORIES

Although The Right to Private Property reflects extensive knowledge of property theory, it is fair to say that Waldron has not been
49. Waldron also reminds us that general rights arguments for private property call for relative, not absolute, equality. Pp. 438-39. If people need private property to help develop moral
independence, then a system that permits some to have nothing will be untrue to its goals. But
the fact that some have much more than others won't necessarily defeat the system's underlying
purpose as long as those at the bottom possess the necessary minimum. Although many progressives will rightly worry that this open-ended qualification may be large enough to permit all but
the most extreme levels of poverty, see infra text accompanying notes 52-54, Waldron remains
confident that continual testing of institutions against the justifications underlying the private
property system will limit inequality to more acceptable bounds.

1644

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1622

significantly influenced by the legal theorists most skeptical of the idea
of property rights and rights in general. so As a result, Waldron fails to
consider some important objections to his approach; objections that
may dominate many reactions to his overall enterprise. This section
will explore some of these anticipated objections. Its goal is to avoid
dismissive criticism of what is a very fine book. The hope instead is
that sustained investigation of some of the weaknesses within Waldron's writing will enable those inside his tradition and those outside it
to work more closely together toward the paramount shared goal of
redressing inequalities endemic to contemporary American life.
The most predictable objections to Waldron's book are somewhat
formulaic and can be summarized briefly. It is sometimes said, for
example, that talk about rights runs the risk of being so abstract as to
be unable to produce specific political conclusions applicable to the
real world.s 1 Surely this is a problem with a book exploring the right
to private property that not once comments on the specific resolution
of a concrete legal dispute. Indeed, Waldron's intellectual framework
is so jntricate that he fully recognizes that the rights of some impose
duties on others (p. 87), that rights often conflict (p. 77), and that
indiv.idual need must qualify claims of right (pp. 439-40). Critics may
fairly wonder how emphasis on the presence or absence of a right will
help adjudicate competing claims that arise from this complex framework (e.g., my need for braces against your right to keep a fixed percentage of your wages).
A substantially similar criticism of rights analysis is that its hard
won conclusions are themselves too indeterminate to be worth the effort. s2 Waldron, for example, devotes enormous energy to demonstrating that if there is a right to private property then everyone has a
right to a certain minimum amount of property. But how much is the
minimum? Is it defined in relative or absolute terms? Do egalitarian
concerns vanish once the minimum is reached? How will a guaranteed minimum help resolve concrete disputes? To what extent, for example, does society have an obligation to provide resources above the
minimum to handicapped individuals who require special medical
equipment?
50. No suggestion is made here that Waldron is biased in his choice of significant authors.
He devotes extensive energy to the works of Robert Nozick and Karl Marx, John Locke and
G.W.F. Hegel, John Rawls and Wesley Hohfeld. Waldron chooses not to consider, however, the
critical legal studies challenge to talk of property rights or certain of its realist forbearers. See,
e.g., R. UNGER, supra note 18, at 36-38 (criticizing liberal version of rights and naming property
rights as prototypical); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L.
REv. 205 (1979) (describing the apologetic role of rights discourse within liberal theory); Singer,
supra note 4, at 632-63 (criticizing liberal vision of property rights); Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 (1954); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927).
51. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1375.
52. Id. at 1371-82.
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Waldron believes the trajectory of our arguments for private property can help determine the necessary minimum level. So, for example, if private property is adopted as a means of ensuring individuals a .
degree of independence, then each person must have enough so as to
be sufficiently independent. The complexities here, however, may be
overwhelming. 53 How much does one need to be independent? Am I
more or less independent if I know that if I waste what I have I will
receive new supplies? If the poorest people in well-developed nations
have more than almost everyone in less-developed nations, should the
focus of richer governments be on internal redistribution or foreign
aid? The point is not that consensus around an idea of a minimum
doesn't advance debate. Rather the fear is that it doesn't advance it
far enough. 54
Still another frequent objection to rights analysis stems from its
perceived over-emphasis on the individual. 55 One concern is that definitions of rights, like Waldron's, that focus on individual interests are
too likely to overlook the importance of group processes in social life.
This objection may take an ethical turn. Thus, the premium placed on
individual values, such as the independence, prudence, and self-assertion that Waldron offers as supporting private property, may be described as obscuring other equally important values like fraternity and
community. Or the objection may take a psychological turn, focusing
on the extent to which individual interests cannot be separated from
group acculturation. These objections remind us that Waldron should
have attempted more explicitly to defend his decision to write solely
about avowedly individualistic approaches to property theory.
The short shrift Waldron gives to the overwhelming contemporary
importance of corporate ownership perhaps best illustrates Waldron's
overzealous commitment to individualistic theories. Waldron asks the
reader to consider Western-style corporate ownership as an outgrowth
or "mutation" of private property (p. 57) rather than a form of ownership in its own right. 56 He argues that corporate ownership often
arises as a result of private initiatives undertaken to fulfill the purposes
S3. I am grateful to my colleague Jim Lindgren for stressing to me the difficulties in defining
a minimum level of wealth or income.
S4. Nor is this purely a theoretical concern. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's
argument in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), rejecting a challenge to the funding method for Texas schools. As long as Texas provided each student the
necessary minimum education, the Court held, there was no constitutional violation in a funding
scheme that permitted the most afiluent district to spend $S94 per pupil each year while the
poorest had only $3S6 per student.
SS. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 60-6S, 147-S2, 173-74
(1982) (criticizing deontological theories for overemphasizing justice and individual rights at the
expense of a more constitutive sense of community); Lynd, supra note 7, at 1418-22 (attempting
to rescue concept of rights from its traditionally individualistic origins).
S6. Waldron recognizes that corporate ownership can also form part of a collective property
system when the state assumes the corporate form for purposes of resource control. Pp. S8-S9.
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of private individuals. Moreover, he notes that property law analogizes the corporate owner to an individual owner for purposes of
granting the corporation final say over use of the owned resource (p.
58).
The initial question here is why recognition of corporate ownership
doesn't threaten the very existence of private property as an "organizing idea." 57 Why, in other words, aren't the rules regulating corporate
governance more fundamental to the society than any rules of private
property? Certainly, this can't be because corporations own insignificant amounts of property. More likely, it's because theories like Waldron's are reluctant to give up on the idea of the primacy of the
individual.
Still more important, readers are likely to wonder why the relentless examination of justifications that characterizes Waldron's book is
not also applied to the question of corporate ownership. If private
property is to be justified by the individual's need for economic independence, can corporate ownership really be justified in the same way?
Waldron's characterization of corporate ownership as simply part of a
private property system spares him the need to address this question.
But it also gives his book the appearance of taking on the abstract
issue of a minimum income without confronting one real source of
concentrated economic power in America. After all, the Right to Private Property purports to be an in-depth exploration of the strengths
and weaknesses of arguments for a right to private property. It would
have been better had Waldron considered all of these stock
objections. 58
Above all, however, the most serious shortcomings of Waldron's
book involve two additional points central to the heart of his enterprise. First, the argument Waldron uses to criticize special rights arguments for private property has considerable bite against the general
rights arguments he wishes at least preliminarily to defend. Thus,
Waldron needs to explain more fully his sympathy for the general
rights approach. Second, Waldron's attack on special rights arguments too quickly minimizes the principal way in which special rights
arguments are superior to general rights arguments. Special rights arguments not only advance the idea that individuals have a right to
private property, but also offer an approach for determining who has a
right to what. General rights arguments do not. Accordingly, the
careless shifting back and forth between special rights arguments and
general rights arguments that Waldron correctly labels a "fraudulent
eclecticism" (p. 444) may also be a structural necessity. If this is so,
57. See supra text accompanying notes 25-35.
58. For an innovative attempt to reinvigorate rights analysis that considers and responds to
these objections, see Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1105, 1224-34 (1989).
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Waldron will encounter serious difficulty in rescuing the concept of
private property from the force of his own critique.
A.

Can Rights Be General?

Waldron's attack on special rights arguments for private property
rests on a simple and powerful premise. The unilateral actions of one
citizen should not be able to place duties upon other citizens, particularly when those duties might involve significant sacrifice. Thus, it
would be all well and good if my appropriation of unowned land created a special relationship between me and the land. But for me to
own the land I would need a special relationship with others who can
no longer use it now that I have been designated the owner. The key
to this relationship, however, cannot be based only on what I have
done. In Waldron's view, it must arise either from actual or hypothetical agreements between me and my fellow citizens.
The problem is that a structurally analogous challenge applies to
general rights arguments as well. After all, Waldron's definition of all
rights-based arguments asks us to examine whether the strength of an
individual interest warrants imposing a duty on one's neighbors to
protect it. But, if the unilateral actions of one citizen cannot impose
duties on others, it is fair to ask whether the unilateral interests or
needs of the individual can do so. In other words, no matter how
strong my interest in having private property, we can only cross the
barrier that converts interest to right after saying something about the
character of the interest that makes it fair to require others to respect
it. But Waldron never satisfactorily explains what that is. Nor would
that task be a simple one.
The underlying dilemma Waldron faces is how to give enough content to the asserted set of rights so that the theory differs markedly
from utilitarian and communitarian approaches, while at the same
time not building in a particular set of rights that render the theory
subject to the charge that, like special rights theories, it merely protects unilateral expectations. As the phrase general rights implies,
Waldron's answer is based on universalization. Thus, when Waldron
speaks of rights, he never really means the concrete rights of an individual derived from her unique circumstances. My need for a seeingeye dog, for example, could never place my neighbors under a duty to
provide me with one. My particularized need is, after all, unilateral. I
might still have a right to the dog, however, if I can redescribe my
need in terms that apply generally to all. Thus, I can argue that everyone has an interest in unrestrained locomotion and that interest is
strong enough that others should respect and defend it. 59 The crucial
59. Another familiar weakness of rights theory is that it appears to offer little guidance for
identifying the proper level of generality applicable to a given dispute. How are we to know, for
example, whether we should see proposals for governmentally supplied seeing-eye dogs as efforts
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question is whether the resort to generalization substantially undercuts
Waldron's defense of the rights approach.
Waldron argues at the outset that rights theory is preferable to
utilitarianism because rights theory makes it more difficult to justify
trade-offs whereby one person would suffer (perhaps unjustly or without cause) so that others might benefit (pp. 77-79). This argument
works well in the case of special rights arguments. The right-holder
takes unilateral actions and becomes entitled by virtue of the special
rights theory to block claims of his fellows that would interfere with
enjoyment of the special right. Thus, individual claims (just ones
where the special rights theory succeeds) prevail over demands of the
collective. The cost, however, is that those injured by invocation of a
special right must respect that right even where they played no part in
creating it and even when its application causes them significant harm.
Waldron, perhaps wisely, is unwilling to pay this price.
Instead, Waldron wants to appeal to rights that through the force
of argument will apply to and thus command the respect of everyone.
It is much more difficult, however, to understand how general rights
arguments operate to weaken Waldron's feared demands of the collective. For the question here is never really whether an individual has a
right to something like property but instead whether every individual
has that right. And, how are we to decide whether every individual
has a particular right without a detailed understanding of what it
would cost every individual to respect that right? 60 Waldron is correct
that once the right is recognized general rights theories will function
differently from straightforward utilitarian approaches. 61 A right may
be respected even when its invocation will obviously cause others to
suffer and perhaps even when long-run overall suffering will exceed
overall gains that the right generates. But the problem with general
rights arguments arises before the question of application. The trick is
in deciding what general rights there are.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical citizen (of whom Waldron
seems so fond) sitting down to decide whether there is a general right
to life. She would presumably agree that each individual has a very
strong interest in living. But does this interest rise to the level of right?
To answer this question our imagined citizen must think carefully
to afford blind people the same right to locomotion as sighted people or as altruistic endeavors to
provide the blind, however deserving, with special privileges? See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 137273 (criticizing rights theory for permitting advocates to manipulate outcomes by focusing on the
level of generality consistent with a desired result).
60. We might ask whether from a moral perspective the duty-holders are themselves obligated to respect the asserted right. In Waldron's terms, however, theories that focus on the
moral situation of the duty holders are duty-based, not right-based, theories. Pp. 68-73.
61. As Waldron recognizes, it is perfectly plausible to incorporate respect for individual
rights as part of a utilitarian analysis. Waldron, however, fears that such respect will never go
deep enough if the existence of the right must always be justified in utilitarian terms. Pp. 12-13.
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about what the duty-holders will be sacrificing in agreeing to respect
the right to life. After all, it is because the sacrifice might be too great
that Waldron rejects special rights arguments for private property that
might leave the duty-holders without moral grounds to use resources
they need to survive.
Acknowledging a right to life, however, might indeed place significant duties on everyone. We all might need to work hard to support
the sophisticated medical equipment needed to save severely damaged
premature infants. How are we to decide whether individuals have an
obligation to take on this burden? And, if we decide against at least
this conception of a right to life, won't we imagine the damaged newborn to feel as though trade-offs between the group and individuals are
being made too easily?62
Waldron might object that the whole point of the general rights
approach is that the question of whether a general right to life exists is
considered not from the standpoint of the group but from the standpoint of the representative individual. Thus, the baby's right to necessary medical care won't be denied merely because of the accumulation
of small benefits to many others, but because a representative individual would conclude that the interest in medical care is not strong
enough to place representative individuals under a duty to provide it.
Presumably, this judgment will include imagining herself as the damaged infant as well as thinking about what it would cost the average
citizen in hours spent to provide the necessary equipment.
A case can be made, however, that in many respects the judgments
of the representative individual will function to frustrate the real-life
individual in the same way as the demands of the group. For almost
by definition, the representative individual can consider only those aspects of human life that individuals have in common. 63 This is why,
for example, success at rights rhetoric always requires translation of
an individualistic claim, like an asserted right to wear a skull cap, into
a universal claim, like the right to practice one's religion. 64 It is also
why an asserted right unique to the experience of a particular individ62. The selection of a so-called positive right that would require the duty holders to affirmatively aid (as opposed to merely not hindering) the right holder may seem to stack the deck.
Precisely the same analysis, however, applies to more traditional negative rights. Even if the
right to life, for example, is conceived of as the right not to be killed, the imaginary citizen must
still consider the costs of living a life in which he cannot murder to gain what he needs. These
costs may appear trivial ifthe imagined society is a just one. Would economically disadvantaged
parents of a severely deformed infant, however, be sure they would want to grant a right to life in
a country where they were forbidden from having more than one child and the economic contributions of their child were their best hope to escape abject poverty?
63. For extended discussion of this idea focusing on the danger that abstract concepts like
"the representative individual" will deny conflicting experiences, such as those between men and
women, see Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986).
64. There is, of course, no guarantee that the minority will be able to persuade the majority
that its idiosyncratic practices deserve constitutional protection. See Goldman v. Weinberger,
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ual or group won't fit well under the rubric of general rights. Thus,
general rights theories have work to do in presenting themselves as
individualistic improvements to utilitarianism.
At the same time, the demand for universalism within rights theory is not necessarily mistaken. It protects against efforts to parade
idiosyncratic needs under the rights banner. Thus, universalism explains the power of Waldron's critique of special rights property theories that seek to transform the unilateral actions of one into duties on
others. Once one takes the demands of universalism seriously, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to draft a theory aimed at placing the rights of the individual above the interests of the collective.
For nothing the individual has ever done or experienced can count in
determining what her rights are. Yet if this is so, how can we really
know which of her interests are strong enough that others are under a
duty to respect them? In the end, the difficulty of answering that question renders the general rights approach highly problematic. If Waldron's enterprise is to succeed he needs to tell us much more about
how we cross the barrier from strong interest to right. He needs to
explain why strong individual interests don't have the same unilateral
character as the conditional actions he forcefully argues cannot create
special rights to private property.

B. Fraudulent Eclecticism, Structural Necessity, or Both?
Waldron's stinging criticism of special rights theories further adds
to the difficulty of giving content to a so-called general right to private
property. A special rights theory might tell us not only that people .
should own a certain amount of property to achieve economic independence but that I should own Blackacre because I have labored
upon it. The best we can expect, however, from a theory that merely
says it's a good idea for some people to own some things is a bit of
guidance away from purely collective or common property systems.
But since even the staunchest opponents of private property would
probably grant that personal items (like toothbrushes) are best owned
by individuals, we are eventually going to have to get past general considerations into specific debates like which goods should be privately
owned and what principles should govern use, exclusion, and transfer.
Many things could be said about these questions, but few will doubt
that they are difficult and, more important, controversial. Any
worked out system of property law will need a mechanism for addressing these problems.
The ideological goal of private property's more conservative defenders is to settle property law's difficult questions with one grand
:flourish. Thus, once it is decided that I own Blackacre, all the issues
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Air Force regulation that barred Jewish
serviceman from wearing a yarmulke on duty).
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of use, exclusion, and transfer are said to fall into place as a result of
the (usually broad) definition of ownership. 65 It is much to Waldron's
credit that he thoroughly refutes any such simplistic solutions. He
demonstrates how ownership can mean many different things, and in
doing so, he brings again to the surface the deep-seated political controversies involved in establishing societal ground rules governing private control over resources. But how are these controversies to be
resolved?
It is here that the rhetorical advantages of special rights theories to
private property systems are most easily seen. For the hope of a special rights theory is that the same underlying justification that established the desirability of private ownership will also come into play in
resolving concrete property law issues. Thus, if I am to be rewarded
for my labor in enclosing unowned land, special rights theories will
require special reasons to adopt rules that would limit my reward by
restricting my ability to transfer that land. 66 More generally, special
rights theories hope to reduce property law disputes to the small
number of issues suggested in the work of Robert Nozick. Did the
claimant acquire the resource in accord with the principles of just acquisition and just transfer set forth in the special rights theory? If so,
then the claimant is the owner, and the hope is that this will settle a
great number of disputes.
Waldron effectively demonstrates, however, that the grand hope of
special rights theories is in fact a vain one. Beyond the obvious
problems in applying even the clearest special rights theory (what, for
example, counts as first possession?), 67 Waldron shows both that the
justifications for special rights theories are themselves questionable
and that no serious work has been done to link special rights claims to
ownership with special rights claims to a power of unlimited transfer
(pp. 260-61 ).
But without special rights theories, how can a functioning property
system settle the day-to-day issues of property law? To what "organizing idea" will legal decisionmakers appeal in determining
whether I may come onto your land to confer with migrant workers
living there? Waldron's work suggests two answers. First, like special
rights theories, general rights theories may themselves suggest underlying justifications that will point to specific resolutions of property
issues. Second, the independent value of adhering to preexisting rules
65. See Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970, 971 (1985) ("To the
person who thinks of rights as being acquired by first possession, the right of alienation seems to
be an inescapable element of the original bundle of property rights.").
66. Id. at 973-90 (suggesting that restraints on alienation are justified when necessary to
prevent misuse of resources like guns or to prevent overexploitation of resources owned by common pool).
67. See Paul, supra note 3, at 757-65 (criticizing first possession as a useful tool for resolving
property disputes).
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may allow many property questions to be settled by convention. Subsequent disputes may then be settled simply by appealing to those conventions. Neither of these approaches, however, has the ideological
power of special rights theories. Nor can either function effectively as
the sole conceptual basis for a private property system.
The underlying justifications for a general right to property are
simply too vague to provide guidance for a wholesale set of property
rules. It is easy to see that a general rights-based theory might support
restrictions of the right to bequeath large estates, if the rationale for
private property suggests everyone should have some property and the
predicted effects of large bequests is that some people will have nothing. Beyond that, however, the mere idea that everyone should have
some undefined minimum amount of property will tell us almost nothing about what rules to adopt. And, so long as there is no perceived
threat to the minimum, legal decision makers attempting to resolve
concrete disputes (e.g., what sorts of restraints on alienation should
there be) will have no underlying theory of property on which to rely. 1
Moreover, as Waldron reminds us, these decisionmakers "need not
be upset by every fluctuation in the relative wealth and fortunes of
individuals. What they will be on the lookout for will be tendencies
towards the accumulation of enormous holdings, particularly of capital resources, on the one hand, and the accompanying development of
long-term propertylessness, on the other" (p. 439). A great deal of
inequality may thus arise before decisionmakers must leave the lifeguard's chair. More important, the general right to private property
will so vastly underdetermine the society's rules governing control
over resources that some other principles will be needed for deciding
concrete cases. Waldron may be successful in confining these other
principles so that they can be trumped by considerations stemming
from the general right. Thus, society may decide to permit bequests to
reward savings but not permit the "reward savings" rationale to apply
where that would interfere with the implications of the general rights
theory. But even then, progressives concerned with wealth distribution will want to know how far each principle will extend before being
persuaded that Waldron has successfully broken the link between private property and inequality.
Waldron further reminds us that the day-to-day rules of the property system may initially be drafted to correspond to notions of a general right to private property but that the rules may then be appealed
to on grounds relating largely to consistency and citizen expectations.
In other words, if the society adopts rules largely permitting transfer
of resources, Waldron suggests it may not then prohibit a particular
transfer simply to reflect a changed attitude toward that transfer. Indeed, perhaps government cannot act even if it now views a ban on
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transfers as a necessary implication of a general right to private
property.
But the effort to rely on citizens' expectations as an organizing idea
to replace special rights theories underestimates the extent to which a
primary role of government is to change property rules in ways that
disrupt expectations. Government, for example, may routinely change
the speed limit in ways that restrict the use I can make of my resources
even if I made a large investment (purchased a trucking company?)
based on the old rules. Only occasionally will such disruptions of expectations be so severe as to violate constitutional protections for
property. The point, however, is that something :i;nore than consis- .
tency must provide the "organizing idea" for shaping citizens' expec- .
tations. Special rights theories provide the illusion of accomplishing
this task by linking the origin of the property right to its content. In
short, special rights theories help specify who owns what. In contrast,
general rights theories will have a difficult time serving as a guide to
citizen expectations because they are simply too imprecise.
None of this is to suggest that the institution of private property
absolutely requires allegiance to special rights theories. Indeed, after
Waldron's work it will become increasingly difficult to defend a special
rights approach to private property. Rather, the point Waldron's
book fails fully to consider is that special rights theories provide much
of the content for what Waldron refers to as our "organizing idea" of
private property. Absent special rights theories we may still want to
argue for individualized control over resources. But even the most
trivial dispute between two individuals for the same resource will pose
a test to our general rights theory. If I need braces and you want to
take a vacation, what does a general rights theory say about whether
you should be taxed to help me out? Does it say enough that it is still
fair to call your ownership of your wages private property? These
questions lie at the root of Waldron's imaginative effort to consider
private property as one of the general rights of men and women.

III.

WHERE WE STAND

In The Right to Private Property, Waldron has demonstrated that
the rights tradition is capable of producing trenchant criticisms of conservative ideology. He has also shown that there is no necessary connection between allegiance to private property and a commitment to
substantial inequality. His work thus constitutes a cogent reminder
that, if pushed hard enough, the premises of individualistic theories
may produce conclusions similar to those advocated by more communitarian thinkers. Waldron pushes these premises very hard indeed.
At the same time, exhaustive as it may be, Waldron's book only
begins to study the hard questions remaining once special rights theories for private property have been definitively rejected. The notion of
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a general right to private property is highly unstable once one abandons traditional labor theories and theories of first possession. It is not
clear precisely how one determines what general rights there are, nor
is it clear what rules one adopts after settling on a scheme of general
rights. Waldron would be more sensitive to the instability of general
rights if he gave greater credence to the well-developed criticisms of
the rights tradition. Perhaps in the future he will afford these critiques
the respect that he has certainly earned from all of us.

